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BOOK REVIEWS
AMERICAN LIBERTY AND "NATURAL

LAW":

by Eugene C. Gerhart. The Beacon Press,

Boston, 1953. Pp. xi, 212. $3.00.
Reviewed by
GEORGE W. CONSTABLE,

The thesis of this book is that there are
two theories of natural law: the American
theory, derived principally from Locke,
supporting freedom and democracy, and
the Catholic one, derived from the Popes,
supporting ecclesiastical authoritarianism.
This thesis is developed systematically by
the author who studs his text with copious
citations and quotations. The whole book
from jacket to contents is framed in a context that suggests that papal teachings are
against the grain of the American tradition.
Mr. Gerhart leaves open the question of
whether there is a natural law, sometimes
seeming to say there is and sometimes seeming to say there is not. The phrase "natural
law" is placed in quotation marks in the
title. What interests Mr. Gerhart is, who
interprets the natural law for us. Who is to
be its spokesman? The ostensible reason this
concerns him -and in this he probably
articulates the fears of many men of good
will interested in natural law -is that a
priestly hierarchy will capture the natural
law movement and will arrogate to itself the
role of interpreter.
The author gets at his point by way of a
series of chapters illustrating generally and
historically that natural law is an elusive
concept with many meanings and uses. This
leads to the conclusion that natural law can
not only support democratic liberties; it
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can also serve as a useful mystique for a
smooth imposition of authoritarian leadership. Having made this point, he proceeds
to suggest that the Church adopts it for the
latter purpose, setting herself up as the sole
rightful interpreter of natural law. This
established to his satisfactiont he then indicates that as such interpreter, the Church
hierarchy would impose an authoritarian
tradition hostile to the American democratic tradition in four areas: freedom of the
State from the Church interference, freedom
of religion, freedom of expression, and
popular sovereignty. From the conclusion
that natural law can support either of these
"opposed" traditions, he draws the moral
that first principles should be carefully
checked and frequently re-examined, that
logic and philosophy are sterile and that
Holmes' pragmatic, skeptical approach is
justified. He closes with a plea for tolerance,
democracy and moderate "English" liberty
as against ecclesiastical authoritarianism.
One should not, however, leap to the conclusion that here is a legal Blanshard. 1
There are many commendable things in the
author's approach: a very evident sincerity,
an earnest concern for freedom of thought,
a desire to buttress every conclusion with
facts, an appreciation of the necessity of
1 See

Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic

Power
*Member of the Maryland Bar.

(1949);

Communism,

Catholic Power (1951).

Democracy
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starting from correct first premises, and a
horror of ecclesiastical interference in purely
secular territory. Nevertheless, what Mr.
Gerhart has done is to write one of those
books, which like the books of old on the
movement of the heavenly bodies based on
the concept of a flat stationary earth, would
never have been written if a prime fact had
been known. He has made a very simple
and obvious error that permeates his basic
message. Confusing the divine (or revealed)
law with the natural law, he misapplies to
the latter the Catholic claim that the Church
is the sole rightful interpreter of the former.
In other words, he conceives that scholastic
natural law theory holds that the Church is
the final, supreme and infallible enunciator
of what the natural law is.
Every Catholic lawyer trained in natural
law knows enough not to take seriously
Mr. Gerhart's thesis. The attitude of such a
lawyer is more likely to be one of searching
for the soft spot in the argument, the entrance point of the mistake. This is to be
found in two small phrases on page 92 that
Mr. Gerhart gratuitously and unjustifiably
slides into a key conclusion:
That in case of conflict between natural
law, as interpreted by the church, and any
statute, court decision, or system of law, the
latter, if it does not conform to the church's

view of the natural law, "is inherently vitiated." (Emphasis added).

Nothing in his citations or previous text justifies the italicized clauses, yet it is his central point. Of course, the teaching is the
precise opposite. One need only turn to the
chief architects of scholastic tradition, Aristotle, and St. Thomas, to see that according
to Catholic teaching natural law is determined by the authority of reason working
upon the data of experience, in particular
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the experience of human nature. 2 From an
analysis of the basic springs of human action, i.e., the will and intellect, the scholastics conclude that there is written into our
nature a precept, good should be done and
evil avoided, good being identified with the
being that is suitable to a natural inclination. From this precept flow all other natural law precepts as well as the influence of
these precepts upon the positive law. Neither
St. Thomas nor other Catholic teachers suggest that natural law gives to clergymen,
qua clergymen, the right of interpretation
or that it vests authority in the hierarchy to
rule society. Mr. Gerhart cites nothing contrary to this. The most that can be shown is
that the Church claims that its infallible
teaching power given by Christ extends "to
all and only" those truths of natural law
which are necessary that the data of revelation be faithfully guarded. In other words,
the apostolic authority claimed to be given
by Christ to the Church to interpret the
Divine Law transcends the authority of reason given by God to all men to interpret
natural law. This is far from Mr. Gerhart's
thesis that natural law supports authoritar'Summa Theologica P-11", q. 91, a. 2: ". . . thus
implying that the light of natural reason, whereby
we discern what is good and what is evil, which is
the function of natural law, is nothing else than an
imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore
evident that the natural law is nothing else than
the rational creatures participation of the eternal
law." (Italics supplied). i-Il"', q. 94, a. 2: "...
Consequently the first principle in the practical
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz.,
that good is that which all things seek alter. Hence
this is the first precept of law, that good is to be
done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon
this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally
apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to

precepts of the natural law as something to be
done or avoided."
In general, see Summa Theo" ,
logica Pa-11

q. 94.
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ianism, ecclesiastical or otherwise.
This is not the only error that Mr. Gerhart has made. In his development of the
supposed antagonism between the papal
views and the traditional American views,
for the purpose of pointing up the alleged
cleavage, he misses the central truth that
the Church takes a moderate position on
liberty offensive alike to doctrinaire liberals
and doctrinaire political authoritarians. But
there is nothing undemocratic about the
view that power in the first instance stems
from God and not the people. It was the
Creator not the people who endowed us
with inalienable rights. It is perfectly consistent with papal doctrine that governmental authority may reside to a large extent in
the people, as coming from God. We know
that factually the power of the government
is not wholly a matter of the consent of the
people. The Constitution was adopted by a
very limited group of voters. Not everyone
votes even today, nor does an individual
have a practical opportunity to reject the
Constitution. Furthermore, it was found desirable to protect minorities against the will
of the majority. Again the separation of
Church and State, as far as political power
is concerned, is perfectly consistent with the
actual cooperation that takes place; for example having chaplains in the Army, or
saying prayers in schools, or recognizing
Christian holidays such as Sunday. Similarly, this seems a poor time to insist that
the American tradition calls for absolute
liberty of expression as against the papal
teachings of certain natural limits thereon.
After all we are forbidding, with overwhelming popular approval, the teaching of
false Communist doctrines; and there has
always been censorship of obscenity and
immorality, prohibitions upon inciting to
riot and laws against slander. Was it not

Holmes who said "No one has a right to
cry 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre"? Does
Mr. Gerhart maintain that these limitations
on liberty depend on majority decision?
Unfortunately, it is the fate of middle-ofthe-road points of view to be attacked from
both sides. In times past, many dictators
and kings have attacked the Church for op3
posing slavery and tyranny in Europe!
The book is marred by much naivete. He
refers to "this remarkable" doctrine of original sin 4 and states that it was designed to
"freeze the Christian Church in a position
of authority;" he seems to think it necessary to cite an authority to prove that Catholics still accept the doctrine of original sin;
he cites Cahn's humorous (or silly) hypothesis that the Jesuits desire to move for
Holmes' canonization; he implies that the
hierarchy puts authority ahead of truth in
contrast to Holmes (as if the search for
truth might not lead us to the authority of
scriptural revelation); and he indicates that
believers in Christian truth are timid and
credulous whereas the critical, agnostic inquirer is courageous.'
There is also much apparent contradiction and equivocation in the argument.
Holmes' dogmatic skepticism is admired
and yet it is said he did not make a dogma
of his skepticism. Mr. Gerhart criticizes the
papal ideas on the reasonable limits of liberty, yet praises moderate English liberty.'
IFor example, the attacks of King James I of
England on the natural law political philosophy of
Suarez and Bellarmine. See Political Works of
James I passim (Mcllwain ed. 1918).
Gerhart, American Liberty and "Natural Law"

182 (1953).
Id. at 80.
6Id. at 152.
As if the scholastic tradition, stemming from St.
Thomas and working through Bracton, Fortescue
and the whole common law tradition, had not been
a great influence in the development of "English

liberty."

THE

He cites persons and texts in justification of
his views when that same person in other
texts would not justify him. 8
One of the most philosophically naive
premises of this book is that one can dodge
the question of the existence of natural law
and still reach an intelligible conclusion
about who is to interpret it. But the words
spoken must tell us of the speaker. In the
case of Mr. Gerhart, he hears the word of
freedom. Yet it is manifestly impossible to
erect a firm foundation for inalienable individual freedom unless one goes into a realm
transcending individual or mass preferences
and desires. In other words, rights must be
founded on a purpose above human purpose, i.e., that of the Creator. So states the
Declaration of Independence and so state
the Popes. It is not a question of choosing
authority over truth, but of choosing the
authority for truth. Who knows truth? Who
can tell what is right? Mr. Gerhart recognizes that one has to rely on someone's
judgment; and he is too sensible to say that
everyone is his own proper judge or that a
majority judgment is per se true or right.
Where does this leave him? In the shifting
sands of tolerance, experiment, search; that
is to say, as far as forming a necessary
judgement is concerned, nowhere. Challenge
him to state the basis for the right to popular rule or to individual freedom and he
would probably duck behind some mere
paraphrase of the very thing to be proven
and thereby retain his one-sided concept of
authoritarianism. But one must sooner or
later be driven to acknowledge that truth
and right give their own authority to those
who can supply a coherent, experimentally
verified account of them- quite indepenFor example, Leo XIII, in his encyclical Libertas
(1888), makes ample room for a moderate liberty
and makes clear that democracy is legitimate.
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dent of whether they are a majority or a
minority, governors or citizens, priests or
laity. So in the matter of natural law one
must be driven to admit the interpretative
authority of those who demonstrate in the
field of ethics, an accuracy of observation
and a cogency of logical induction.
On that basis, all men of good will and
competent intellect can take up the struggle
to develop what is right and what wrong.
If Catholics are wrong on any given issue,
let the error be shown: but why abuse the
scholastic tradition as "authoritarian." If
in the fields of war, colonialism, international law, revolution, the authority of government, social policy and elsewhere, errors
can be pointed out, let that be done - but
do not attack the whole idea of a transcendental law because of possible mistakes of
detailed application.
The average law student of the natural
law movement will probably be sad at this
book. It will pain him to see the wonderful
revival of interest in natural law become
involved in a religious controversy just
when it would rescue society from the dominant positivism of which the logical result
is either chaos or despotism. At the very
time when thoughtful men are searching for
a rational anchorage to secure individual
rights against the impositions of arbitrary
human will (whether of the masses, of the
few or of one), here comes a book which
sows the seeds of suspicion against the archsupporter and exponent of the natural law
position.
Yet on reflection there may be a happy
fruit to be expected from such books as
these. When reasonable, competent menand Mr. Gerhart is one-air their differences, we can hope for a new and deeper
understanding of the truth that is acceptable
to both. And underlying Mr. Gerhart's
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vision is the general truth that the American-Lockean-Jeffersonian tradition is long
on freedom, whereas the Catholic-Aristotelian-Aquinas tradition is long on duty.
The former speaks most typically in terms
of Bills of Rights, the dignity of the individual, and popular self-government; the
latter in terms of doing good and avoiding
evil, seeking virtue and perfection and complying with the will of God. Both traditions
are valid, both are good, and each would
be wanting in wholeness were it to exclude
the other. In Washington's day, the need
was for a legal basis of wresting freedom
from the political, economic and religious
autocracies of Europe. In our day the need
is for a legal basis of combining this freedom with a generally beneficial social order.
The collectivisms of both right and left, i.e.,
Fascism, Nazism and Communism, are examples of what happens when there is an
attempt to satisfy the need to order society
for the general welfare when there is no
sound philosophy for preserving the basis
of the freedoms gained in the past.
The need of the day is precisely for a
legal theory that gives due place to both
liberty and duty. And that is where the
scholastic natural law tradition can draw
on the democratic tradition and where the
democratic tradition can be saved by the
scholastic tradition. Catholic Americans can
admit without harm to their cause that
many proponents of the scholastic tradition
tended not only to give implicit rather than
explicit attention to the doctrines of political liberty (including St. Thomas himself)
but also to obscure when they were speaking under the apostolic and scriptural authority and when under the authority of
natural law. On the other hand, non-Catholic Americans like Mr. Gerhart can readily

admit that our basic charters, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, are mostly rights and few
duties, and that social idealism working
through statutory and common law has had
to struggle to fill the gap.
It is up to Catholics to redouble their
efforts to show how great a place Aquinas
and his philosophical descendants have
made for freedom. But it is up to the Gerharts to do a little studying and acknowledge that the scholastic natural law system
is truly a system that has reason - intellectual perception - working from observation
of human nature and its context, as its sole
interpreter; and that it distinctly eschews
blind faith in scripture or in a hierarchy as a
valid source of its precepts or as a basis for
an authorized governmental power.
On final estimate, then, it is well that the
religious issue has been specifically raised.
How else can one learn that there can be no
legal "ought" binding men not to encroach
upon one another's self-determination unless there is a purpose in the universe that
transcends each man's self-determined purpose? There can be no rights without duties;
no refuge from human tyrannies without
homage to God. Freedom is seated in religion: it is the Creator- not fickle men who endows man with inalienable rights.
This does not mean revealed religion, rather
rational religion - the faith that reason can
erect from its inquiry into the facts and
from its logical reflections derived therefrom.
This is where the supporters of Holmes,
like Mr. Gerhart, miss the point about the
unhappy consequences of that great jurist's
philosophy. They do not understand the
reason for the criticism. Mr. Gerhart touches
on the reason briefly, only to dismiss it with
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an inapposite citation from a skeptic.9 Yet
the critics of Holmes, too, have often made
a mistake. Not a little harm has been done
to the natural law estimate of Holmes and
particularly the scholastic natural law estimate by the claim that if one eliminates
God one is driven logically to totalitarianism. The fact is, one is left in the quicksands of two general alternatives, granted
there is no discernible Divine Purpose: the
alternative that every intention is right insofar as it can effectuate itself and the alternative that every intention is right insofar as

it does not conflict with any other intention.
One line of thought leads to the despotisms
of simple power, the other to anarchies of
individualism. The latter was perhaps more
characteristic of Holmes than the former,
although he vacillated between the two.
Scholastic natural law purports to save
us from this hopeless social schizophrenia
built upon agnostic jurisprudence. It is to a
deepened integration of liberty and order,
of right and duty, of getting and giving,
upon a religious basis, that we must look
for the happy results of Mr. Gerhart's work.

Text and Cases by Orvill C. Snyder. The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1954. Pp. xxxvi, 882. $10.00.
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Reviewed by
A.B., LL.B., LL.M., J.U.D., D.Phil. (Oxon.)t

The author of this book, Professor of
Law at the Brooklyn Law School, states that
its purpose "is the examination of the persistent core of meaning of words of large
import, like law, state, sovereignty, legislative, judicial, executive, proof, right, liability, duty, power, privilege, immunity,
property, thing and person, as those words
are used in deciding concrete cases." 1 Implicit in this purpose, however, is a thorGerhart, op. cit. supra note 4, at 126, citing M. D.
Howe: "For those of us, however, who doubt the
cosmic significance of human values, I wonder
whether the rejection of the absolute necessarily
entails such destructive consequences. May not the
value which is merely human have an influence
on law as decisive as that which is gloriously absolute?" But the question is not of the decisiveness
of influence, but of the beneficial and binding nature of the influence. The Communist influence is
human and decisive upon the fate of millions.
tProfessor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans, La.
' Snyder, Preface to Jurisprudence, Text and Cases
v (1954).

ough exemplification of the analytical school
of jurisprudence, founded by Austin through
inspiration from Hobbes and Bentham, and
later developed by such jurists as Holland,
Salmond, Kocourek, Kelsen and Hohfeld.
Indeed the work is partly dedicated to the
memory of Albert Kocourek from whom
Professor Snyder probably derived his
juridical faith as a result of two courses
in jurisprudence under his instruction at
Northwestern University Law School. 2 He
hails Professor Kocourek as the greatest
analytical jurist of them all, 3 and acknowl-

edges his intellectual indebtedness to the
4
late Walter Wheeler Cook.
The book consists of six parts. A similar
structure appears in each part, save the final
one, namely, chapters in which a short text
by the author, presented from the point of
'Id. at 18, footnote.
8Id. at 9, footnote 29.
4
Id. at 18, footnote.

